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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robert Leroy Huck appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia, entered upon his conditional guilty
pleas. On appeal, he challenges the district court's denial of his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The factual background of this case, as related by the district court, is as follows:
On June 16, 2011, Officers Kelly Montoya, Jim Schiffler, Guy
Borgeau and Officer Phillips, all of the Boise Police Department, were
working together as a "Direct Patrol Team." Shortly before 7:30 p.m.,
Officer Phillips received information regarding a drug transaction occurring
in the Albertson's parking lot at the corner of Overland and Vista in Boise.
Officer Phillips dispatched the other officers who were each in separate
patrol vehicles to respond to the scene. He informed the other officers
that the Defendant, Robert Leroy Huck ("Defendant") may be in
possession of narcotics and provided a description of the Defendant and
the vehicle he was driving. Other than the information received from
Officer Phillips, the three other officers had no independent information
regarding the situation. In responding to the scene, Officer Montoya
observed the Defendant driving westbound on Overland and proceeded to
follow the vehicle from a distance of about two car lengths. The other
officers followed behind at various car lengths.
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Officer Montoya witnessed the
Defendant's vehicle make a northbound turn onto Roosevelt Street. He
proceeded to initiate a traffic stop based on his observation that the
Defendant failed to utilize his signal for the period of time or distance as
required by Idaho Code § 49-808(2) prior to making the turn. Officers
Schiffler and Borgeau arrived and stopped at the scene of the traffic stop
within a few seconds of the stop.
Officer Montoya contacted the Defendant in his vehicle, informed
him of the reason for the traffic stop and obtained his driver's license. He
told the Defendant that when making the turn onto Roosevelt Street, he
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didn't engage the turn signal until he was already into the turn. After
returning to his vehicle and running the Defendant's information through
dispatch, Officer Montoya asked the Defendant if he had any problem if he
searched the vehicle. The Defendant refused the request, stating that it
was not his vehicle. Officer Montoya then asked Officer Schiffler to write
the traffic citation while he went to retrieve his K-9 drug dog, Remco
("Drug Dog").
After returning with the Drug Dog, Officer Montoya advised the
Defendant that he was going to use the Drug Dog to conduct a sniff
around the exterior of the vehicle and directed the Defendant to exit the
vehicle and stand over next to Officer Borgeau. Officer Borgeau also
directed the Defendant to exit the vehicle and directed him not to put his
hands in his pockets. Officer Borgeau testified that the Defendant
appeared nervous and was hesitant to exit the vehicle and prior to exiting
rolled up the window and locked the door. Officer Borgeau ordered the
Defendant to place the keys on the top of the car explaining that it was a
"safety issue." The Defendant reluctantly complied but questioned the
request, arguing that it was not his car. Officer Borgeau testified that after
the Defendant exited the vehicle, he turned away from him and towards
the car, dropping his hands down towards the front of his waistband area
and out of sight. This sudden movement immediately led Officer Borgeau
to suspect the Defendant was either attempting to conceal evidence or
retrieve a weapon. In response, Officer Borgeau grabbed the Defendant
by the forearm and led the Defendant to the rear of the vehicle for the
purpose of conducting a pat-down search of the Defendant. Prior to
conducting the pat-down, Officer Borgeau asked the Defendant if he had
anything on his person he needed to know about, including "weapons,
needles or anything that would hurt him." The Defendant responded he
had no weapons or needles. When asked if he had "something else" on
his person, the Defendant admitted to having methamphetamine in his
pocket.
Meanwhile, the Drug Dog sniff of the vehicle's exterior resulted in
an alert near the driver-side door. Officer Montoya then proceeded to
deploy his Drug Dog to conduct a sniff of the interior of the vehicle,
resulting in the Drug Dog alerting to a black bag sitting on the passenger
seat. A subsequent search of the black bag by Officer Montoya revealed
seven syringes and a digital scale. The Defendant was subsequently
placed under arrest. At no time prior to the arrest was the Defendant read
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his Miranda rights. The traffic stop until the time of the arrest lasted
approximately ten (10) minutes.
(R., pp.126-28 (footnote omitted).)
The state charged Huck with possession of methamphetamine and possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.30-31.) The state later filed an Information Part II, alleging
an enhancement against Huck for being a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.58-59.)
Huck filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that (1) law enforcement
lacked probable cause to conduct the traffic stop; (2) no reasonable, articulable
suspicion existed to remove Huck from his car; (3) Huck's detention was prolonged; (4)
law enforcement failed to give Huck Miranda 1 warnings prior to questioning him at the
scene; and (5) no evidence existed of the drug dog's qualifications. (R., pp.52-53; 7588.) The state responded to the motion, arguing that the traffic stop was lawful, that the
seizure of Huck was lawful, that Huck was not in custody when he told officers that he
had methamphetamine in his pocket, and that Huck lacked standing to challenge the
vehicle's search. (R., pp.95-108.) After additional briefing by the parties and a hearing
on the motion, the district court denied Huck's suppression motion. (R., pp.126-38.)
Huck entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion. (R., pp.140-48.) The district court entered judgment against Huck
and sentenced him to seven years with three years fixed on his conviction of
possession of methamphetamine, but retained jurisdiction for a year. (R., pp.156-58.)
Huck filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.153-55.)

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
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ISSUE

Huck states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Huck's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Huck failed to show error in the district court's denial of his suppression
motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Huck Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
During a traffic stop, Huck admitted to officers that he had methamphetamine in

his pocket and, through a contemporaneous search of Huck's vehicle, police found
additional quantities of methamphetamine and a digital scale. (R., pp.126-28.) Huck
filed a suppression motion (R., pp.52-53, 75-88), which was denied by the district court
(R., pp.126-38). On appeal, Huck asserts that the district court erred by denying his
suppression motion because, he argues, the stop was illegal, he was wrongfully
removed from his vehicle, his Miranda rights were violated, and/or the traffic stop was
unreasonably extended. 2 (Appellant's brief, pp.7-16.) Application of the correct legal
standards to the facts found by the district court, however, shows no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
When review a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86,
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286
2

Huck also argues that the district court erred in its determination that Huck lacked
standing to challenge the search of his vehicle. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-16.) Whether
Huck had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle, however, need not be
addressed in this case. Each of Huck's appellate challenges focuses on his detention,
whether it was lawful both at its inception and in its duration, and whether it became
custodial. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-18.) The ultimate search of the vehicle, which
was based on probable cause from a drug dog's alert, is not challenged. The state
concedes that Huck has standing to challenge his detention.
5

(Ct. App. 1996).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of

witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P .2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999).

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Huck's Suppression Motion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic
stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is more
similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.
App. 2003).

"An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific

articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)).
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held in
Miranda v. Arizona that before an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the
interrogating officers must advise the individual of certain rights, including the right to
remain silent. ~, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The test for determining whether an individual is
in custody for purposes of Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the
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circumstances surrounding the interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."

California v.

Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495
(1977)).

Because the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom

associated with formal arrest, "the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention
involved in a traffic stop ... does not constitute Miranda custody." Maryland v. Shatzer,
559 U.S. 98, _ , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 439-40 (1984)).
Applying the relevant legal standards to the facts before it, the district court
correctly held that Huck's detention and search were reasonable and complied with
constitutional standards.

(R., pp.126-38.)

Huck challenges the district court's ruling

regarding his detention on various grounds, each of which is addressed below.

1.

The Traffic Stop Was Lawful

Huck asserts that the traffic stop was unlawful. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) As
noted above, a traffic stop is lawful when "it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417). When an officer observes a traffic violation, initiating a
traffic stop is reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
In this case, Officer Montoya testified that he pulled over Huck because he
observed Huck failing to properly engage his turn signal before turning from Overland
Road onto Roosevelt Street as required by Idaho Code § 49-808(2).

(4/9/2012 Tr.,

p.44, L.13 - p.45, L.5.) The district court found that, under the circumstances of this
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case, Idaho Code § 49-808(2) required Huck to signal "for not less than the last one
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." (R., p.129.) Officer Montoya
testified, consistent with the audio recording of the traffic stop, that Huck failed to signal
until he had already entered the intersection to turn onto Roosevelt Street. (4/9/2012
Tr., p.65, L.22 - p.66, L.11; see also State's Ex. 1.) The district court found "Officer
Montoya's testimony to be credible and to be corroborated by the audio recording of the
traffic stop."

(R., p.130.)

The traffic stop was therefore legal based on Officer

Montoya's actual observation of a traffic violation.
Allowing "that credibility determinations are left to the discretion of the trial court,"
Huck asserts that his testimony was credible and the district court should have accepted
it instead of the officer's. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Credibility determinations, however,
are not merely left to the trial court's discretion; rather, "it is the province of the trial court
to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses." Snider v. Arnold,
153 Idaho 641, _ , 289 P.3d 43, 45 (2012) (citing Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho
570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 (2005)). Appellate courts will not substitute their views of
the evidence for that of the trial court.

kl

Weighing the evidence before it, the trial

court determined that Officer Montoya's testimony was credible. (R., p.130.) Huck has
failed to show clear error in that determination. Huck has failed, therefore, to show error
in the district court's determination that the traffic stop was lawful.

2.

Officers Did Not Violate Huck's Fourth Amendment Rights By Ordering
Him To Exit His Vehicle

Huck argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was
ordered to exit his vehicle.

(Appellant's brief, p.10.)
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"[O]nce an officer has lawfully

stopped a motor vehicle for a traffic violation, ordering the driver to get out of the vehicle
does not offend the Fourth Amendment." State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 104, 137 P.3d
1024, 1026 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6
(1977).

Because, as established above, the traffic stop was lawful, Huck's Fourth

Amendment rights were not violated when officers ordered him to exit the vehicle.

3.

Because Huck Was Not In Custody, Officers Did Not Violate His Miranda
Rights By Questioning Him At The Scene Of The Traffic Stop Without First
Giving Him Miranda Warnings

Huck argues that the district court erred by concluding that he was not in custody
for purposes of Miranda while he was being frisked and questioned during his detention.
(Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) The defendant bears the burden of establishing that he
was in custody for purposes of Miranda. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d
1169, 1172 (2010). As mentioned above, the test for determining whether an individual
is in custody for purposes of Miranda is whether, objectively considering the totality of
the circumstances surrounding an interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Beheler, 463
U.S. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).

Relevant factors in making this

determination include the time, location, public visibility of the interrogation, the conduct
of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, the extent to which officers
confront the suspect with evidence of his guilt, and the presence of other persons.
State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). Also as noted
above, because the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom
associated with formal arrest, "the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention
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involved in a traffic stop ... does not constitute Miranda custody." Shatzer, 559 U.S. at
_ , 130 S.Ct. at 1224 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40).
Correctly applying the relevant legal standards to the facts before it, the district
court concluded that Huck was not in custody prior to his arrest. (R., pp.131-35.) The
traffic stop lasted roughly ten minutes, which officers testified was a normal duration for
a traffic stop.

(R., p.132.) The traffic stop occurred in a public area along relatively

busy streets.

(R., pp.132-33.)

The number of questions asked by the investigating

officer was modest, and the questions were consistent with a Terry stop. 3 (R., pp.13334.) Finally, prior to arrest, Huck was never handcuffed, nor was he informed that his
detention would be anything other than temporary.

(R., pp.134-35.)

Viewing these

factors objectively, a reasonable person would not believe there was a "formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
Nonetheless, on appeal, Huck "asserts that he was in custody because he had
been ordered out of the vehicle, frisked despite denying he had weapons, and there
were three officers on the scene."

(Appellant's brief, p.12.)

These factors, while

relevant to the inquiry, do not establish custody for purposes of Miranda. There is no
question that Huck was seized when he was subjected to a traffic stop and frisked.
Everything Huck has described, however, is consistent with an investigatory, or traffic,
stop, and the "detention involved in a traffic stop . . . does not constitute Miranda
custody." Shatzer, 559 U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1224; see also State v. Young, 136

3

Before frisking him, the officer asked if Huck had "any weapons, any needles,
anything that is going to hurt me." (R., p.133; see also State's Ex. 1.) Huck only denied
the first two, saying "I have no weapons. No. I have no needles." (Id.) The officer
followed-up with, "Okay. Do you have something else?" (Id.) Huck acknowledged that
he did. (Id.) The officer said, "You seem to be hesitating. What do you have?" (Id.)
To which, Huck admitted, "I have a little methamphetamine." (Id.)
10

Idaho 711, 720, 39 P.3d 651, 660 (Ct. App. 2002) (where a team of officers did not draw
their weapons, use force or handcuffs, the suspect was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda; even though "the officers controlled [his] movements to a certain degree, they
did not control his movements to a degree associated with formal arrest").
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d
435 (1981 ), is instructive. In that case, Ybarra was a suspect in a bank robbery.

~

at

574, 634 P.2d at 436. He was stopped by several officers, ordered out of his car at
gunpoint, and frisked.

~

After determining that Ybarra was not armed, two officers

questioned him about the robbery "while the other officers receded from the scene."
Ybarra made several incriminating statements to the officers.

~

~

He subsequently

moved to suppress those statements, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his
Miranda rights.

~

at 576, 634 P.2d at 438. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, held

that Ybarra was not in custody because he was not "deprived of his freedom of action in
a significant way so that Miranda warnings were required."

~

at 576-77, 634 P.2d at

438-39.
While recognizing that "a multitude of police cars and officers present[ed] a vastly
more intimidating scenario" than would have occurred had only one officer stopped
Ybarra and questioned him,

~

at 577, 634 P.2d at 439, the Court also noted that

virtually every police-citizen encounter will result in some degree of intimidation, but that
is not determinative of the question of custody:
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have
coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is
part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect
to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the
requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning
11

takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one
whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where
there had been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him
"in custody." It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda, by
its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.
~

(quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). If Ybarra, removed from his car at gunpoint

and frisked by a team of officers, was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, then
Huck, who was subjected to a far more benign detention, was also not in custody.
The facts found by the district court in relation to Huck's suppression motion
clearly establish that Huck was detained. They do not, however, establish that Huck
was deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way so as to implicate Miranda.
Although ordering Huck out of the vehicle and frisking him had the effect of restricting
Huck's movement to a certain degree, that restriction was not sufficient for a reasonable
person in Huck's position to believe he was in police custody to a degree associated
with formal arrest. Huck failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was in custody
for purposes of Miranda. The district court's denial of Huck's suppression motion on the
basis of an alleged Miranda violation should be affirmed.

4.

The Traffic Stop Was Not Unreasonably Extended

Huck argues that his detention was "unreasonably prolonged by the time the
drug dog alerted to the vehicle."

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-18.)

An investigative

detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must also be conducted in a
manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500

(1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004). "There is
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no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary;
rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement
purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop." State v. Grantham, 146
Idaho 490,496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008).
The district court held that Huck's detention was not prolonged by Officer
Montoya presenting his drug dog to conduct an open air sniff while another officer
prepared a citation. (R., pp.136-37.) Because the dog was on scene and the sniff took
place contemporaneously with the other officer writing the citation, the traffic stop was
not extended by the sniff. (Id.) The district court's determination is supported by the
Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct. App.
2000).

In Parkinson, the Court held it was permissible for one officer to question a

vehicle's driver about drugs and weapons and to take a drug dog around the vehicle
while another officer was busy checking with dispatch on the driver's status and writing
out a traffic citation. !Q.,_ at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 306-07.
Acknowledging that the drug dog was already on scene and that Officer Montoya
delegated the responsibility of writing the citation to another officer, Huck nevertheless
contends that the stop was impermissibly extended. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-18.) Huck
argues that the stop was extended because he was not ultimately issued a citation.
(Id.) However, as Officer Montoya testified at the suppression hearing, Officer Schiffler
in fact wrote out the citation. (4/9/2012 Tr., p.58, Ls.4-7.) Huck was not issued the
citation because he "stated he wanted to help himself out with working as a confidential
informant." (4/9/2012 Tr., p.49, Ls.3-10.) Huck also argues that the stop was extended
because Officer Montoya, after learning of Huck's criminal history, asked questions
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"regarding that history, even though this was not related to the purpose of the stop."
(Appellant's brief, p.17.)

Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious circumstances

which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. State v. Myers,
118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). Asking Huck limited questions
about narcotics and weapons, after learning of his history of narcotics and weapons
violations, would constitute part of a reasonable investigation, even if that was not the
purpose of the initial stop.

See Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134;

Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 306-07. Huck has failed to show error in the
district court's determination that his detention's duration was reasonable.
Huck's detention was reasonable and complied with the standards of the Fourth
Amendment. Because Huck was never in custody prior to his arrest, his Miranda rights
were not violated when officers asked him questions at the scene of the traffic stop.
Huck has failed to show error in the district court's application of the relevant legal
standards to the facts found.

The district court correctly denied Huck's suppression

motion and should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of
Huck's motion to suppress.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2013.

Deputy Attorney General
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